« The discussion about nuclear weapons requires more than nostalgia »
US security guarantees have long been a pillars in the European continent’s security policy architecture. Not least the US nuclear umbrella that rested over Europe has played a crucial role. These conditions have also been fundamental to Swedish security policy thinking and relevant, both during our period of neutrality and since we became full members of NATO.
More recently, however, the American shift in focus towards the Pacific region, combined with the doubts about future American NATOSOLIDARITY born in the wake of the US presidential election, has challenged traditional European thinking.
In Sweden, even the idea of developing its own nuclear ability has been brought to life and has come to be discussed. Today’s discussions often refer to the former Swedish nuclear weapons program, which was born conceptual in the late 40s, took a firmer form during the 1950s and finally, on good grounds, finally abandoned during the 1960s when Sweden de facto ended up under the US nuclear umbrella as part of « the secret alliance ».
Without strong land, sea and air combat forces become a nuclear threat either without credibility or risks escalating rather than deterrent
The newly revoked The discussion about Swedish nuclear weapons has partly been characterized by vigorous assumptions, rapid position choices and references to the Swedish historic nuclear weapons program. The discussion is as interesting as relevant, but this serious issue, however, requires presence in today’s reality, not nostalgic flashbacks. If Sweden is to consider a nuclear program at all, own or in collaboration with others, the reasoning must be anchored in our time and in the current geopolitical context.
Three basic principles should form the basis of such reasoning:
1. Nuclear weapons require a conventional ability. Nuclear weapons do not replace conventional military strength. On the contrary, it is solely in combination with a credible conventional ability that nuclear weapons can seem daunting. Without strong land, sea and air combat forces, a nuclear threat is either without credibility or risks escalating rather than deterring.
2. Tactical nuclear weapons are not enough. The Swedish nuclear weapons program that was scrapped in the sixties was focused on tactical nuclear weapons – small nuclear charges that would be inserted, among other things, against enemy shipping ports to make a Soviet invasion more difficult. The difference is that today we are facing an opponent who not only has extensive nuclear weapons arsenals, but also a desire to use nuclear weapons as a political pressure and a doctrine where tactical and strategic nuclear weapons are separated.
A Swedish nuclear holding must be able to match this. Tactical nuclear weapons without strategic backing can lower the threshold for nuclear weapons use and increase the risk of escalation than seem daunting.
3. Disgrace requires volume and other law. In order for a nuclear detail to be credible, the opponent must also know that we can strike back, even after a first -hand type.
This requires not only technical capacity but also volume, spread and a number of platforms on land, in the air and at sea that can carry nuclear weapons. Single charges are neither politically credible nor militarily effective. A deterrent without second -time is an air castle.
The threats in our immediate area are acute and close, and it is our conventional defense that needs to be prioritized here and now
Against this background, two more factors must be taken into account:
● First, a modern Swedish nuclear weapons program would take decades to develop. We don’t have that time. The threats in our immediate area are acute and close, and it is our conventional defense that needs to be prioritized here and now. A nuclear weapons project would risk pushing away resources, competence and political attention from what is most necessary.
● Secondly, a Swedish nuclear holding would require superb control. It is probably not appropriate to base such holding on EU cooperation where we do not know what the EU of the future looks like, which states are included in the Union of 20-50 years, or what governments govern individual Member States at this time. A Swedish nuclear weapons program must rest on national availability, although Nordic cooperation on technology and infrastructure could be meaningful if several Nordic countries choose the same path.
In summary It can be said that anyone who currently advocates Swedish nuclear weapons must understand that we cannot dust off the thoughts of the 60s. There is no paused program to start up and we also live in another time – with other threats, other technological conditions and a completely different geopolitical map. Having the discussion about Swedish nuclear weapons is legitimate, but letting that discussion focus on the urgent need to build defense capabilities here and now would be a historical mistake.
We need a strong Swedish total defense to defend our boundaries, our democracy and our independence. If in the future we are to take the step into the nuclear club, it must be done after a thorough analysis and discussion based on strategic seriousness, not tactical nostalgia.
