Flight Frankfurt-Siviglia, a pilot loses the senses while the other is in the bathroom: plane travels for 10 minutes without anyone at the commands
The fact occurred in February 2024 but only the details have only been made public. Once above Spain the commander, who came out to go to the bathroom, had to use the emergency code to open the door
With the first officer officer without a senses and the commander blocked outside, beyond the armored door, a plane with over 200 people on board flew over Europe without any human supervision for ten minutes and with the automatic pilot inserted. The fact happened in February of last year, on the Frankfurt-Siviglia flight, but only recently the outlines have been made public with the publication of the investigation relationship of the Spanish Air Safety Authorities.
The request to review the rules
In the end the aircraft was landed, as a precaution, in Madrid. But the Iberian experts asked the European Air Safety Agency (EASA) if it is not the case to reintroduce the obligation of two people in the piloting cabin, in all circumstances, to avoid the repetition of events of this type. A measure that had been imposed in 2015, after the tragedy of the Germanwings flight made independently of the first officer on the French Alps while he was alone in the commands. But then had been « downgraded » to simple suggestion.
Flight
On the morning of February 17, 2024 an Airbus A321 by Lufthansa takes off from Frankfurt to carry out the LH1140 flight with Siviglia destination, south of Spain. On board there are 199 passengers and 6 crew members. The journey proceeds without any warning. Around 11.20 (Italian time) the two pilots speak « about the meteorological situation and on the aircraft », writes the report of the Spanish authorities. « According to the commander, the co -pilot seemed to be in good shape and attentive at that moment. »
The commander leaves the cabin
At 11.31 – when the jet is now above the Iberian peninsula, at an altitude of 35 thousand feet (10,668 meters) and while proceeding at almost a thousand kilometers per hour of speed – the commander decides to leave the cabin to go to the front bathroom, the one that is immediately behind the armored door that separates the stations of the pilots from the passengers. At 11.32 and 6 seconds the first officer loses his senses. In the following moments, the flight controller tries to get in touch with the cabin three times, but without success. At 11.40 am – the investigators note – the commander « uses the standard entry procedure to access the piloting cabin »: once « intercom » from outside, those who are inside receives a sound notice and can also control the monitor connected to a camera.
Nobody opens the armored door
But from inside, after several seconds, nobody authorizes and the door does not unlock. The commander thinks he has entered the wrong code or that the first officer has been committed to carrying out some maneuver and thus makes a second attempt. Also in this case no reaction. Three other attempts follow, while a flight attendant calls the pilot cabin away. The situation begins to look terribly on the flight Germanwings as dynamics.
The emergency measurement
Thus remains one last procedure to be carried out: the code for emergency access. Composed of four figures – which type in a numerical panel next to the front bathroom – it serves to open the door from the outside. Once the sequence is inserted, those inside are 30 seconds to intervene and deny the request. After this time the automatic system unlocks the armored panel for 5 seconds, enough – in normal situations – to open it with a simple push.
The co -pilot resumes consciousness
The commandment of the Frankfurt-Siviglia flight thus types the secret code. But, it is the reconstruction made by those who are the edge, not even the 30 seconds pass that from the inside is the same first officer – who in the meantime has resumed aware – to physically open the door, getting up and somehow reassuring everyone. At 11.42 the commander takes control of the aircraft, at 11.43 and 51 seconds contact the Radar Center. The co -pilot is « pale and sweaty » so the commander asks for the help of the flight attendants to help his colleague. A doctor who travels as a passenger and who suspects a heart problem also intervenes.
The deviation for medical rescue
The commander decides to divert to the nearest airport, that of Madrid to have the medical staff intervene on the ground. The aircraft touches the track 18 minutes later, without any consequence on passengers and on flight safety. The Courier He contacted Lufthansa about the story but did not get a comment at the time of the publication of this article.
The investigation relationship
In the 37 -page long report published on May 15, the commission of investigation into the accidents and inconveniences of the civil aviation writes that the loss of consciousness of the first officer – owner of a regular class 1 medical certificate without any limitation – was caused by a condition that had not been previously detected by the pilot himself nor during the aeronautical medical examination.
« Without human supervision »
Analyzing the data of the black boxes, then, the investigators noticed that during the loss of consciousness the first officer « unwittingly opened switches and acted on the flight controls », but that the automatic pilot and the drive system « remained active and the flight route was maintained ». For this reason, the plane continued to fly for about 10 minutes during the cruise phase « without additional supervision by any pilot ».
The notice to sailors
In its conclusions the document is clear enough on a couple of points. « This accident highlighted the benefit of having another authorized person in the cabin when one of the two drivers leaves it for physiological or operational reasons, » investigators write. « His presence would have contributed to the rapid identification of the inability of the co -fingering, notifying the rest of the crew and opening the safety door to facilitate the rapid access of the commander and allow him to take control of the aircraft ».
The recommendations
« In light of this accident – we still read – it is considered appropriate to communicate the peculiarities of this problem (to the first officer, editor’s note) to the operators so that, taking them into consideration, they again revise the risks associated with the fact that a pilot remains only in the cabin when the other abandons it. Therefore, it is considered appropriate to make a recommendation to EASA in this regard ».
